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Soldiers attached to 2nd Infantry Division destroy simulated chemical weapons manufacturing equipment 22 March 2016 during training
near the Korean Demilitarized Zone in Black Hawk Village, Republic of Korea.
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CBRNE

I

n April 1980, a U.S. military operation of utmost
strategic importance spectacularly failed before
the entire world, bringing embarrassment to the
United States, unease to our allies, and celebration to
our adversaries. Eight Americans died without having
ever been engaged by enemy forces in the operation
that was aborted long before it was close to its objective.
In the aftermath, Iranian television jubilantly showed
the charred remains of the eight blackened American
corpses during ensuing press conferences.
Operation Eagle Claw had aimed to rescue fifty-three
Americans in two locations in the heart of Tehran who
were taken hostage in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This
complex operation integrated operators from the Army,
Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and different intelligence
agencies; forty-four aircraft from the different services;
thousands of gallons of fuel; and a convoy of vehicles for
insertion into a hostile city of over four million people.
Forward reconnaissance had marked two locations in the
desert, known as Desert One and Desert Two, for aircraft
to land. C-130 aircraft from the Air Force, loaded with
the rescue force and fuel bladders, would rendezvous with
Navy helicopters piloted by marines at Desert One, where
they would conduct refuel operations without illumination.
From Desert One, the eight helicopters would ferry the rescue force to Desert Two on the outskirts of the city, where
vehicles would be covertly staged to begin the infiltration
early in the morning to the locations harboring the hostages.
Expecting a firefight once the Iranians became aware of the
rescue attempt, helicopters would arrive at a nearby soccer
stadium to exfiltrate the hostages and rescue force to a nearby airport seized by Army Rangers so that a second fleet of
fixed-wing transports could fly everyone to freedom.1
Leading up to Operation Eagle Claw, the teams involved from the different services and agencies had never
operated together or conducted a full mission rehearsal.
Mission command confusion and mission complexity
contributed to the crash between a transport plane and
helicopter resulting in American deaths, abandonment of
equipment and sensitive information in the Iranian desert,
and ultimately, the cancellation of the overall mission.
Analysis of the operation in its aftermath concluded
that failure could largely be attributed to the services
having brought together specialized, functional, stovepiped organizations on an ad hoc basis. Gen. Stanley
McChrystal would later comment that, “At best, the
plan was a series of difficult missions, each a variable
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in a complex equation. At worst, with an ad hoc team,
it called for a string of miracles.”2 The needed miracles
did not happen, and the resulting failure would forever
change the way the United States approached organizing, training, and resourcing special operations.

Applying Lessons of the Past to
Better Prepare for the Realities of
the Operational Environment
This article examines the Army 20th Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE)
Command’s efforts in 2014 to 2015 to organize, train,
and resource for CBRNE operations in order to achieve
the Nation’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
CBRNE objectives. These initiatives are a conscious effort
to avoid ad hoc organizational solutions that could lead to
mission failures similar to Operation Eagle Claw.
Given the nexus of ideology, technology, and
CBRNE materials employed by state and nonstate actors, the authors offer that WMD may be better viewed
as a subset of the more encompassing term CBRNE,
which more accurately reflects anticipated mission sets
and serves as a broader lens for force employment. We
suggest that dealing with future operational environments in accordance with recently published strategic
guidance would best be accomplished by reorganizing
Army CBRNE forces and regionally aligning them in
preparation to execute their critical mission sets.

Multifunctional CBRNE Task Force
In order to evaluate the possibility of effective
multifunctional CBRNE formation employment, the
20th CBRNE Command developed and implemented
a multifunctional CBRNE task force (TF) concept to
synchronize the synergistic capabilities of our chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) forces
with those of our explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
forces and nuclear disablement teams. The CBRNE
TF concept underwent continual evaluation at the
Army’s combat training centers (CTCs) and during an
Army-wide Network Integration Evaluation to identify
critical capability gaps and challenges.3
To increase our understanding of those gaps, and to
aid in the development of solutions for them, the CTCs
provide an optimal tactical environment for assembling
the CBRNE enterprise’s senior leadership as part of the
20th CBRNE Command’s “Scientists in the Foxhole”
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initiative.4 This initiative is an immersive experience
to better inform scientific research, technology
acquisition, and policy formulation through observation of the execution of CBRNE operations
in a multiechelon, field-training environment that
includes a realistic replication of the full range of
anticipated CBRNE hazards.

The CBRNE Strategic Landscape
Taking the strategic landscape of 1980 and
applying it to today, one would be hard pressed to
find a more “cannot fail” mission than countering
weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). Nearly
every strategic guidance document published
identifying threats to the United States and its allies
highly prioritizes CWMD as a clear requirement as
known adversaries continue to pursue these types of
capabilities.5 Whether those adversaries are criminals, terrorists, or nation-states, “increased access to
expertise, materials, and technologies heightens the
risk that these adversaries will seek, acquire, proliferate, and employ WMD.”6
Operational environment. With today’s unprecedented global interconnections and the ease of access
and distribution of information and threat technology,
potential CBRNE employment methods are much
harder to contain, track, and therefore counter. The
danger is also growing as regular and irregular forces,
criminals, refugees, and other agents increasingly intermingle and interact among themselves internationally
across traditional lines.
While WMD may elicit the notion of difficult-tomake-and-access nuclear or chemical weapons, many
CBRNE hazards are commercially available, easily
procured, and when coupled with a delivery means, can
have WMD-scale devastating effects. Therefore, employing WMD, and more broadly CBRNE weapons, is
no longer the sole purview of nation-states. In addition
to a broad range of readily available conventional weapons, state and nonstate actors can select from an array of
affordable technologies that can be adapted in unconventional ways. We should, therefore, anticipate that
our adversaries will seek to develop and employ CBRNE
capabilities to shape the operating environment by
inflicting casualties, creating conditions to deter or defeat
entry operations, and eroding public allied or coalition
support together with the basic will to fight.
64

WMD and CBRNE terminology. Numerous organizations exist across the national security enterprise
studying the CWMD problem set, with many varying
nuances in their definitions of WMD. However, all have
the same objectives of preventing WMD development
and use, and preparing for consequence management.
The American public expects that its government
and national security enterprise will be trained and organized correctly to meet any threat, regardless of how vast
or complex. Also, there is the public’s expectation of rapid coalescing of capabilities to defeat, contain, or respond
effectively to CBRNE threats to protect U.S. interests.
To apply the lessons learned from Operation Eagle
Claw, it is paramount that we ensure that military forces and interagency partners responsible for confronting
WMD (and more broadly CBRNE threats and hazards) are not ad hoc groups of functional, stovepiped
organizations coming together on the objective without
previous experience working together, but rather, are
an integrated force continually training for and collectively organizing appropriately to respond.

Expanding the Scope of the Threat
The Department of Defense (DOD) defines WMD
as “chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons
or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or
causing mass casualties. This does not include the means
July-August 2016
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(Photo by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

CBRNE leaders and scientists observe a simulated fuel rod enrichment facility during the Scientists in the Foxhole event November
2015 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

of transporting or propelling the weapon where such a
means is separable and divisible part of the weapon.”7
However, there is an increasing recognition of the expanded scope and impact of CBRNE threats and hazards.
A 2014 CWMD white paper by the Army Capabilities
Integration Center states, “the Army’s approach to
CWMD is consistent with the DOD definition and
includes the expanded scope of explosive threats resulting
in a high order of destruction. This full range of CBRNE
threats and hazards is representative of the combined
arms approach for future force capabilities development.”8
In addition to broadening the scope of explosive
yield considered, the full range of CBRNE threats
and hazards is recommended as a broader umbrella
concept for organizing, training, resourcing, and employing forces, where the WMD mission space exists
as a subset of CBRNE. Including the range of low- to
high-yield explosives to holistically characterize the
current and future range of threats and hazards better
captures the subset of critical tasks that EOD soldiers
perform in operations, including unexploded ordnance
disposal to improvised explosive device (IED) defeat.
With this perspective, for the purposes of organizing
MILITARY REVIEW
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Army operations, the term represented by the acronym
CBRNE should be used as the operative term that integrates and accounts more accurately for these threats
and the capabilities needed to counter them.
These perspectives are drawn from the lessons
learned from the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2012
and multiple explosive attacks that include the 1993
New York City bombing of the World Trade Center,
the 1995 Oklahoma City car bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building, the 1996 truck bombing of
the Khobar Tower military complex in Saudi Arabia,
the October 2000 boat bombing of USS Cole, and the
April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.9
To further illustrate this point, explosives in the
form of jet fuel, coupled with the delivery means of
an airplane, exemplified a terrorist-delivered CBRNE
event on 11 September 2001, with mass effects that
would not otherwise be formally characterized as
caused by a WMD under the DOD definition.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Pamphlet 525-7-19, The United States Army Concept
Capability Plan for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction for the Future Modular Force, 2015-2024, provides this discussion on the categorization of WMD:
Whether or not the definition of WMD, or a
definition of CWMD, will eventually include
all explosives, it is appropriate to acknowledge that future solutions developed in
response to CWMD capability requirements
must consider cross-utility for such things as
explosives detection and forensic analysis of
trace chemical residue. Any analytical capability developed for CBRN applications ought
to consider the chemical nature of explosives
as part of the requirement.10
With this expanded CBRNE/WMD perspective,
state-sponsored nuclear and chemical WMD are
considered here as a subset under the broader umbrella
concept of CBRNE threats and hazards.
While difficulty in acquiring, developing, and delivering weapons increases from chemical to biological
to radiological to nuclear, with low-yield explosives
remaining cheap and easy, accelerating technological
advancement enables a greater ease in the development
and employment of not only single threat types but
also more complex hybrid CBRNE threats delivered in
parallel or serial within a given operational area.
65
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· Three all-CBRNE-hazards-capable
CBRNE brigade task forces
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Figure 1. Proposed CBRNE Brigade
Task Force Organization
In the same manner in which the 9/11 terrorists
coupled innovative delivery means with a combustible
fuel, we must anticipate unique and coupled delivery of
multiple elements of the CBRNE threat spectrum. For
example, IEDs are likely to remain a pervasive tactical
threat, with the increasing ability to be employed simultaneously with other CBRNE components. Regardless, to
successfully defeat the simultaneous presentation of various types of CBRNE threats within an operational area
requires unity of command and unity of effort of special
purpose, highly technical forces to appropriately synchronize an effective response. Ad hoc solutions will not work.

Current Organizational Challenges
and Deficiencies
The 20th CBRNE Command comprises the majority
of active component EOD and CBRN units, and these
units are currently organized functionally into three
brigade-level commands. The 20th CBRNE Command’s
mission requires the unit to deploy forces to support
unified land operations and perform mission command
66
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fense, and defense-sup-  technical oversight requirements
port-of-civil-authorities
objectives, while providing globally responsive CBRN
and EOD forces to combatant commands.11
In support of the mission, the current functional
organization of the command does not capitalize on
overlapping CBRN and EOD mission areas or core
capabilities, nor are any of the subordinate formation’s
efforts focused on any specific global region. Therefore,
the distributed nature of the command across sixteen
states and nineteen installations creates inefficiencies
in the execution of mission command, impacts negatively on readiness, and leads to ad hoc solutions when
considering how to best resource emergent contingencies that call for the simultaneous employment of EOD
and CBRN forces.
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Figure 2. CBRNE Brigade Task Force Regional Alignment:
Unity of Command and Unity of Effort
Reorganizing CBRNE Task Forces for
Improved Efficiency
We offer that to operate effectively across the
CBRNE spectrum, the Army must broaden the historically limiting view of the 20th CBRNE Command as
focused only on CWMD and counter-IED operations. It
must be available for employment across the full range of
CBRNE threats and hazards and across the full range of
military operations. Rather than viewing the operational
environment through a narrow CWMD lens, analyzing
problems through a wider CBRNE perspective better
illuminates challenges and opportunities, and it leverages
the full capability of the command.
For example, recent deployment of the 20th
CBRNE Command’s area medical lab in support of
Operation United Assistance, the response to the Ebola
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crises in West Africa, illustrates an example of CBRNE
force employment that would have been precluded
based on a strictly WMD employment mindset.
We propose that to meet similar future challenges
emerging from the rapidly changing strategic environment, as well as the intent of the Quadrennial Defense
Review and the directives of the Army Strategic Planning
Guidance, by task-organizing the functionally organized
command into three multifunctional CBRNE brigade
TFs.12 Each TF would be enabled with robust CBRNE
planning and coordinating expertise and technical
reach-back capabilities provided by an aligned CBRNE
coordination element (see figure 1).
Establishing unity of command, defining clear objectives, and employing maneuver to capitalize on the
flexible application of power are battle proven remedies
67
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Figure 3. Regional Alignment Construct
for complex challenges. Reorganizing the 20th CBRNE
Command to create three multifunctional, regionally
focused CBRNE brigade TFs will ensure that the Army
has ready, reliable, and globally responsive CBRNE
capabilities to meet the challenges of the current and
future strategic environments.
Reorganizing the command from its current configuration of one CBRN brigade and two EOD groups
into three similarly organized CBRNE brigade formations would result in an immediate increase in national
capacity, with zero growth in personnel.
Whether for training or contingency operations, or
as enduring organizations, task-organizing into three
regionally aligned multifunctional CBRNE brigade TFs
would ensure that these forces are properly organized,
focused, positioned, and prepared to respond globally
to ever-evolving CBRNE threats.
This adjustment to mission command can be
achieved with no physical relocation of units, and it
would immediately deliver more flexible and capable
regionally focused CBRNE forces. Given the anticipated reductions of EOD force structure due to Total
Army Analysis 18-22, the proposal would mitigate the
68

(Graphic by Col. F. John Burpo, U.S. Army)

challenges of historical ad hoc solutions to similar and
anticipated future mission sets and it would overcome
the command’s current unity of command and unity of
effort challenges resulting from the widely distributed
basing construct and complex mission profiles.
For the supported commanders, task-organizing
the command would resolve the issue of disparate
command and support relationships of CBRNE forces
throughout the formation by assembling them under a
single O-6 commander and integrated staff.

Regional Alignment of CBRNE
Brigade Task Forces
The CBRNE brigade TF concept (henceforth referred
to as a CBRNE brigade) would enable the packaging of
trained and ready CBRNE forces under one commander.
This would increase mission command effectiveness and
reduce the impromptu relationships reminiscent of ad
hoc planning for Operation Eagle Claw.
Each CBRNE brigade would be regionally aligned with
the Army service component commands, and in support
of the three Army corps based in the continental United
States (CONUS) in accordance with the Army’s regional
July-August 2016
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Figure 4. Potential Integrated CBRNE Mission Packages
alignment of forces concept (see figures 2 and 3).13 TF 71
(CBRNE), positioned in the western United States, would
align in general support of I Corps with a focus on the U.S.
Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR). TF 48
(CBRNE), positioned in the central United States in general support of III Corps, would focus on the U.S. Central
Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European
Command AORs. TF 52 (CBRNE), located in the eastern
United States, would align in general support of XVIII
Airborne Corps and their global response force mission.
Task-organizing and regionally aligning the 20th
CBRNE Command’s subordinate formations would
markedly improve readiness through unity of command,
unity of effort, and increased “train as you intend to fight”
familiarity between 20th CBRNE and supported forces.
By focusing efforts regionally and aligning in support of
the Army service component commands through the
three CONUS-based corps, the command would be
better prepared to fulfill its expeditionary mission requirements without relying on traditional ad hoc solutions.
Through task organization, the leaders, soldiers, and
civilians of the 20th CBRNE Command would become
MILITARY REVIEW
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better informed about their potential primary operational environment and better able to train habitually
with their supported maneuver formations. This, in
turn, would increase interoperability and enhance
examination of specific regional threats, from current
combat operations to the entire range of threats found
across the combatant commands.

CBRNE Task Forces at the Combat
Training Centers
To test the CBRNE TF concept, the 20th CBRNE
Command organized and employed different configurations of CBRNE battalion-task-force formations
in support of brigade combat teams during nine CTC
rotations in fiscal years 14 and 15. Additional rotations
are planned for fiscal years 16 and 17. Both CBRN
and EOD battalions have served as the integrating
headquarters under which CBRN, EOD, and CBRNE
response teams; nuclear disablement teams; and expeditionary laboratories have been assembled.
CBRNE TFs can be scaled and tailored across a
range of possible contingency operations as shown in
69

figure 4. These mission-tailored CBRNE TFs provide the
supported commander a “single point of touch” to plan
and execute interrelated CBRNE mission sets, allowing
for effective mission command of technical forces on
CBRNE target sites.
To increase training realism, the 20th CBRNE
Command collaborated with the National Training
Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the
Brigade Modernization Command at Fort Bliss, Texas, to
build an array of new CBRNE target sites. With equipment transfers from Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
other interagency partners, these targets replicated an
unprecedented degree of CBRNE training realism.
When mission sets and training objectives warrant
the employment of CBRNE TFs, the training relationships and lessons learned are invaluable to operationalizing the force. They serve as a foundation for future
concept development.

Resourcing—Scientists in
the Foxhole and Advanced
Technology Demonstration
Given the 20th CBRNE Command’s multiple
proponents that oversee interrelated CBRNE force
doctrine, training, and resourcing issues—including
the CBRN School, the EOD Directorate, and the
U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency
(USANCA)—a holistic enterprise solution is required. To facilitate that approach, the 20th CBRNE
command, in collaboration with the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, organized a “Scientists in the
Foxhole” initiative.14 This effort assembled senior
leaders throughout the CBRNE enterprise, to include representatives from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council; Headquarters,
Department of the Army G-8; U.S. Army Forces
Command; the Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical and Biological Defense ( JPEO-CBD);
Research and Development Command; the Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center; USANCA; and the EOD
Directorate. The program provides senior leaders and
scientists from the CBRNE enterprise an opportunity
to meet with and observe soldiers and civilians conducting CBRNE tactical operations in a live force-onforce training environment.
70

These type of engagements serve to assist CBRNE
enterprise leadership in recognizing and articulating capability gaps and defining potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions to enable the Nation’s CBRNE capabilities.
For example, JPEO-CBD, in partnership with the 20th
CBRNE Command and many of these same enterprise
partners, is leading an advanced technology demonstration to accelerate technology development and implementation and address multiple operational issues while gaining efficiencies in materiel and nonmateriel solutions.15
This enterprise approach to holistically and more rapidly resource capability gaps and requirements allows the
Army and the joint force to better resource an integrated,
combined arms approach to combating CBRNE threats.

Impacts: The Way Forward
Organizing the functional subordinate formations of
the 20th CBRNE Command into three multifunctional,
regionally aligned CBRNE brigades is an important step
in meeting the Army’s strategic planning guidance for this
one-of-a-kind formation. This reorganization provides
the Army and the Nation with an immediately improved
solution, with no growth and no physical relocation of
units, for delivering integrated CBRNE capacity to meet
expeditionary and campaign requirements.
The expanded definition of CBRNE threats and hazards, with WMD and CWMD missions as a subset, facilitates a more expansive understanding of the operational
environment and better informs the analysis of potential
geographic regions that would require the employment
of the command or its subordinate elements. Continued
training and validation of the multifunctional CBRNE TF
construct at CTCs, in concert with innovative enterprise
efforts such as the Scientists in the Foxhole and Advanced
Technology Demonstrations, ensure that the Nation’s
CBRNE forces are properly organized, trained, and resourced for mission success, avoiding ad hoc organizational failures such as those seen in Operation Eagle Claw.
It is imperative that the 20th CBRNE Command
provide the Army and the Nation with ready, reliable, and
globally responsive integrated CBRNE forces capable of
leading and executing CBRNE operations and activities
anytime and anywhere. Task-organizing the command
better enables that end state through unity of command,
unity of effort, and a regional focus accounting for all
CBRNE hazards, to better inform our training and equipping strategies.
July-August 2016
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